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The space environment (at least where the Earth’s orbits are concerned) 
is increasingly congested. As a natural result, collisions between space 
objects are becoming more likely and much more disastrous. A collision 
would not only destroy those colliding objects, but could create a debris cloud 
that threatens many other objects in the orbit. As a response to this, the 
United States government has expressed a willingness to consider a regime 
whereby the trajectory of American satellites is subject to government 
control, similar to the air traffic management system. While this may be a 
necessary step in salvaging the space environment, legislators must be 
appropriately cautious because this level of governmental control may give 
rise to legal liability for any accidents involving American assets. This paper 
will address some of the considerations that must be made—particularly that 
the current space tracking system is not of sufficient quality to allow for 
trustworthy trajectory manipulations by the government.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING ACCIDENTS IN 
SPACE
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (adopted in 1971) imposes fault-based liability on states who launch 
an object into space which then causes damage to another object in space.1
Any states who contributed to the launching of such an object may be held 
liable under this agreement.2 Having an avenue like this through which 
damaged states may seek specific reparations is relatively novel in 
international law and it has only been used once.3 In 1978, the Canadian 
government demanded damages from the Soviet Union for cleanup costs 
when a Russian satellite crashed in the Canadian wilderness, spilling fuel 
waste and other contaminants.4 Under the Liability Convention, the Russian 
government was strictly liable for all damage its space object caused on the 
surface of the Earth,5 but there was significant debate as to whether that 
recourse was limited to the direct damages of the fallen satellite (which were 
limited, due to the unpopulated area in which it fell), or if the indirect 
damages associated with the cleanup were also payable to the Canadian 
government.6 Also at issue was the Soviet obligation to pay for cleanup when 
it was not afforded the opportunity to conduct it themselves.7 After lengthy 
arbitration, the Canadian government agreed to a sum of C$3 million, which 
did not encompass the total sum of their costs, but did seem to pay for some 
indirect cleanup costs.8 Overall, it is hard to glean any helpful precedent 
from this case, especially since the vast majority of accidents occur in space, 
where states are only liable if they are at fault.
The reason for the distinction between Earth accidents and space 
accidents is obvious. Where there is a possibility for human injury, state
parties to the agreement (especially non-space-faring ones) wanted a strict 
liability imposed on this extremely risky activity.9 After all, objects re-
                                                          
1. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. III, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Convention on International Liability].
2. Id. at art. V.
3. Alexander N. Yakovlev, Canada: Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
for Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos 954, 18:4 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 899–930 (1979).
4. Id.
5. Convention on International Liability, supra note 1, at art. II.
6. See generally Peter P. C. Haanappel, Some Observations on the Crash of Cosmos 954, 6:2 
J. SPACE L. 147 (1978).
7. Id.
8. Protocol Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Can.-U.S.S.R. art. I, Apr. 2, 1981, 1470 U.N.T.S. 269. 
9. Stanley Mazaroff, Exonerations from Liability for Damage Caused by Space Activities, 54:1 
CORNELL L. REV. 74 (Nov. 1968).
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entering the atmosphere have been known to wreak significant damage.10 In 
space the loss is financial, though also significant. Large satellites cost 
upwards of millions of dollars, with some reaching ten figures.11 Launch 
services that would have to be redone in the event of a loss of a satellite are 
extremely expensive. If a satellite is destroyed through the negligence of 
another party, it is reasonable to want these costs to be remunerated. The 
Liability Convention foresaw this, and provided for a mechanism. However, 
the Convention requires that countries seek damages from the Launching 
States of the object, even if the damage was caused through the negligence 
of a private organization.12 So, if a company’s satellite was damaged by the 
negligence of another, they would reach out through their national 
government and seek damages from the country of nationality of the guilty 
satellite. Launching states are free to create domestic regimes that require 
private operators to indemnify them against liability.13
In the United States, this has taken the form of a system of federal 
regulations requiring private space operators to carry insurance up to the 
maximum probable loss, an amount found by using the statutorily provided 
formula.14 The government subsidizes some losses above that number (up to 
roughly $3 billion), in an effort to incentivize American private space 
operations.15 Combined, the insurance (pursuant to its terms) and the 
government pay any claims made by injured third parties, or by other nations 
through the Liability Convention.16 However, this mechanism has never 
been activated for a Liability Convention claim. This is not because there 
have been no catastrophic losses of American satellites because of foreign
satellites—quite the opposite.17 Rather, the problem is proving negligence 
on the part of the foreign operator as required for a valid claim under the 
                                                          
10. ASSOCIATED PRESS, FOX NEWS, About 1,100 Injured as Meteorite Hits Russia with Force 
of Atomic Bomb (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/science/2013/02/15/injuries-reported-afterme
teorite-falls-in-russia-ural-mountains.html.
11. The Cost of Building and Launching a Satellite, GLOBALCOM, http://www.globalcomsat
phone.com/hughesnet/satellite/costs.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
12. Convention on International Liability, supra note 1, at art. II.
13. Id. at art. V.
14. 14 C.F.R. § 440.7(a) (2016).
15. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE., GAO-14-328T, COMMERCIAL SPACE 
LAUNCHES: FAA’S RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS IS NOT YET UPDATED (2014).
16. Id.
17. See Yuri Pushkin & Melissa Gray, Russian, U.S. Satellites Collide in Space, CNN (Feb. 12, 
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/02/12/us.russia.satellite.crash/index.html?_s=PM:TECH 
(explaining in 2009, a derelict Russian satellite crashed into an operational American communications 
satellite, completely destroying the two satellites and creating a major debris cloud that is a threat to the 
space environment even today).
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Liability Convention.18 Space is not easily observable, and while we are 
generally aware of where space objects are because of tracking by the Joint 
Space Operations Center (JSPOC),19 we rarely can pinpoint the exact cause 
of an accident, let alone prove negligence by international standards.
Faced with the ever-increasing number of space objects, Congress 
passed the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act in 2015.20
The legislation illustrated the general sense that the United States is failing 
to uphold its international obligations to “authorize and supervise” the 
activities of its nationals in space,21 which is a topic for a different paper. In 
short, the United States does not exercise any control over the behavior of 
objects while they are in space beyond a few restrictions placed on the 
licenses of remote sensing systems and communication satellites.22 As part 
of the effort to correct this failure and to address the increasingly urgent space 
debris problem, Congress requested thought on the legal ramifications of 
engaging in Space Traffic Management: a system similar to that of the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) air traffic management system 
where flight paths are assigned based on mission requirements, and can be 
altered by the government.23 Put simply: the government wants to know 
what the concerns are if a government agency is entrusted with the regulatory 
authority to make a satellite change its trajectory in order to avoid a collision. 
It is the opinion of this author that while such authority will likely be 
necessary in the future, it should be approached carefully as to avoid 
incurring liability under the Liability Convention, resulting in significant 
losses to the United States government and any indemnifying parties. To 
explore this opinion, it is important first to look at why this is a problem: the 
rise of the small satellite and space debris.
                                                          
18. Kay Hailbronner, Liability for Damage Caused by Spacecraft Proposals of Belgium, U.S.A.,
Hungry, India, and Italy, 30 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 125, 133 (1970), http://www.zaoerv.de/30_19
70/30_1970_1_t_125_141.pdf.
19. U.S. Strategic Command, USSTRATCOM Space Control and Space Surveillance,
STRATCOM.MIL (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Factsheets/Factshee View/Article/97
6414/usstratcom-space-control-and-space-surveillance/; U.S. Strategic Command, Functional 
Components, STRATCOM.MIL, http://www.stratcom.mil/components/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2017)
(explaining that the Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC), located in Vandenberg, California, is a 
component of USSTRATCOM and is tasked with space surveillance and helping coordinate military 
space efforts in support of American servicemen and against hostile powers).
20. See Pub. L. No. 114–90, 129 Stat. 704 (2015).
21. Pub. L. No. 114–90 Sec. 108, 129 Stat. 704 (explaining that legislation required a report on 
appropriate mechanisms to authorize and supervise all space operations to “meet the United States 
obligations under international treaties”).
22. See Pub. L. No. 114–90 Sec. 108–109, 129 Stat. 704.
23. See Space Traffic Control, LOCKHEEDMARTIN.COM, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/
news/features/2015/space-traffic-control.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
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II. CONGESTED, CONTESTED, AND COMPETITIVE: SMALL-SATELLITES 
AND SPACE DEBRIS
When the space treaties were written, the only things in space were 
small government-owned satellites very few and very, very far between.
That is simply no longer the case.  Currently, there are approximately 
500,000 space objects (including debris) in orbit around Earth.24 Of these, 
20,000 are the size of a softball or larger and are trackable by JSPOC.25
Moving forward, the growth in the number of satellites will be largely due to 
the launch of small satellites, or satellites roughly five pounds or smaller that 
generally do not possess any propulsion systems or other intensive 
operational capabilities.26 Currently, the JSPOC issues conjunction warnings 
to all operators, including foreign operators and those of small satellites, 
when they are likely to collide with another object.27 However, for small 
satellites, such warnings are rather perfunctory as without propulsion 
systems, they cannot maneuver out of the collision course.28 This is 
especially true when the collision is likely to be with a small piece of debris 
barely trackable let alone maneuverable. When involved, large satellite 
operators with evasive capabilities nearly always adjust trajectory29—while 
expending the fuel to move is expensive, it’s not as expensive as losing a 
trillion dollar satellite.
The JSPOC conjunction warnings are the only governmental service of 
their kind provided by any nation.30 Several private companies have also set 
up tracking systems to alert paying customers to threats to their space assets, 
which can augment the services provided by the government.31 However, 
such data is far from perfect. First, current tracking capability is limited to 
                                                          
24. Mark Garcia, Space Debris and Human Spacecraft, NASA.GOV (Sept. 26, 2013), 
https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html.
25. Id.
26. Nanosats Are Go!, ECONOMIST (June 7, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/
technology-quarterly/21603240-small-satellites-taking-advantage-smartphones-and-other-consumer 
technologies.
27. See Duane Bird, Sharing Space Situational Awareness Data, AERO.TAMU.ADU,
http://aero.tamu.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/alfriend/S4.1%20Bird.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
28. Rob Matheson, Electrospray Thruster Make Small Satellites More Capable, MIT NEWS
(Mar. 11, 2015), http://news.mit.edu/2015/accion-systems-thruster-for-small-satellites-0311.
29. See Garcia, supra note 24.
30. Bird, supra note 27; see also Pub. L. No. 114–90 Sec. 109, 129 Stat. 704 (stating that 
Congress is currently considering a re-delegation of this responsibility to a civilian agency, leaving the 
actual tracking with the Department of Defense, but allowing a civilian agency to handle the conjunction 
warnings to private enterprises).
31. See generally Llima Loomis, Private Firms Spy a Market in Spotting Space Junk,
NATURE.COM (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/private-firms-spy-a-market-in-spotting
space-junk-1.18425.
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objects ten centimeters or larger—roughly the size of a softball.32 Anything 
smaller than ten centimeters will not be catalogued or tracked, but smaller 
objects still pose a serious threat to satellites and should be avoided. Even 
something the size of a dime travelling at 17,500 mph will do a lot of damage 
to sensitive equipment (solar arrays are especially at risk). Additionally, the 
system issues conjunction warnings when an object travels within [two]
kilometers of another.33 This has resulted in a very high number of warnings 
being issued that are false alarms—the very definition of a boy crying wolf.34
For now, it is the decision of the satellite operator whether to heed the 
warning of the JSPOC, something that would likely change if a government 
agency was granted traffic management authority. This burden would be 
most heavily felt by large satellite operators with the capability to avoid 
collision, something that must be taken into consideration moving forward.
It will be important for the government to get much better at space object 
tracking before requiring operators to move on suspect information.
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES “FAULT” FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE LIABILITY 
CONVENTION?
The reality is that the United States government does not operate with 
100% certainty of the location of space objects in orbit. Even with the 
introduction of Lockheed Martin’s Space Fence (a new space surveillance 
system using a mixture of space and ground assets on a higher wave 
frequency to improve object tracking)35 sometime in 2018, tracking 
capabilities will still be limited. There is significant risk of the government 
missing a conjunction, as in the Intelsat disaster, or (worst case scenario) the 
government could require a satellite operator to alter their trajectory resulting 
in a collision that otherwise would not have occurred. In the event of a 
foreign satellite being damaged or destroyed in either of these scenarios, the 
potential for liability under the Liability Convention is substantial.
The Liability Convention creates a legal duty for states not to damage 
the space objects of other states through their actions.36 In that sense, it is 
clear that if and when the United States government orders the maneuver of 
a satellite that results in damage or destruction of a foreign satellite, a 
                                                          
32. Garcia, supra note 24.
33. Brian Weeden, 2009 Iridium-Cosmos Collision Fact Sheet, at 2, (Nov. 10, 2010),
https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_collision_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf.
34. Id. (explaining this over-warning was largely a reaction to the tracking system failing to 
notify of the impending conjunction of the Roscosmos and Iridium satellites, resulting in one of the most 
disastrous debris-creating events in history).
35. How to Keep Space Safe, LOCKHEED MARTIN, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/
products/space-fence.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
36. Convention on International Liability, supra note 1, at art. II–III. 
2017] Miller 285
 
Liability Convention claim is simple—the United States affirmatively 
engaged in behavior that resulted in damage. The United States may be able 
to point to exonerating factors37 such as faulty information in the tracking 
system or contributory negligence on the part of the foreign operator for 
failing to heed conjunction warnings (the United States would obviously 
have no authority to command a shift in trajectory for a foreign satellite). 
However, the likelihood of success of a claim for damages under the Liability 
Convention would be significant because of the government’s involvement 
in the accident. 
Where the issue is much less clear is whether an omission (failure to
require trajectory adjustment) would constitute fault for the purposes of 
establishing a claim under the Liability Convention. International law 
demands that in order for a state to be responsible, they must be in breach of 
an international obligation.38 It is unclear whether there is an international 
obligation to prevent collisions in space. The analysis is further complicated 
by the fact that until space traffic management authorities are granted, no 
state has possessed the power to prevent collisions by mandating trajectory 
adjustment.39
Given the state of the international community and international law as 
a whole, it is unlikely that international obligation to prevent space collisions 
will be read into the space treaties. However, renewed international 
commitment to the preservation of the space environment may create an 
international obligation to avoid and prevent debris-causing accidents.
International responsibility for failure to prevent may be imposed that way. 
International environmental law already recognizes a duty to prevent 
transboundary harm arising from polluting activities,40 a theory that could be 
extended to require states to act affirmatively to protect the space 
environment from preventable collisions that pollute the orbits with debris. 
Moreover, this doctrine recognizes that when the damage was the result of 
                                                          
37. Id.
38. U.N. Legislative Series, Book 25: Materials on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 97 ¶ 1, ST/LEG/SER/B/25, (2012).
39. See generally INT’L MARITIME ORGANIZATION, International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), http://www.mar.ist.utl.pt/mventura/Projecto-Navios-I/IMOConventions
%20(copies)/COLREG-1972.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) (comparing maritime collision regulations to 
space collision.  Interestingly, in maritime law there is a set of international regulations dedicated to 
preventing collision between seafaring vessels which impose duties on seafaring nations to prevent such 
collisions, but while maritime law is a useful analogy to space law, it is much more specific and well-
developed than international space law.  This means that the existence of such collision-prevention 
regulations can serve only as a glimmer of hope for international consensus in issues of this kind moving 
forward).
40. Lada Soljan, The General Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm and Its Relation to 
Four Key Environmental Principles, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 209, 232 (1998).
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an accident, and nobody was at fault, there is no liability assigned.41
Therefore, if the United States government fails to warn of an impending 
collision but without any negligence or wrongdoing, they could not be held 
internationally liable under this theory of international law.
However, at home the story could be quite different: domestic law 
could grant American companies a cause of action against the government in 
the event of satellite damage or destruction stemming from the government 
failing to require evasion of a potential collision—the current cross-waiver 
system does not envision a situation where the government could fail to 
uphold its end of a licensure bargain. This would be akin to filing suit against 
the FAA in the event of a failure of air traffic controllers to prevent an in-air 
collision. Because the federal government waived its immunity in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act of 1944, it may face liability for negligent conduct 
in official duties42—such as those duties required in space traffic 
management. However, a court may find that a space traffic controller acts 
with discretion in determining whether an order to change trajectory is 
necessary, and therefore the government retains its immunity under the law.43
Case law suggests that, if the model for air traffic control is used, a space 
traffic controller may be held liable for his negligence because “operators 
merely handle operational details which are outside the area of the 
discretionary functions and duties referred to in s. 2680.”44 Ultimately, the 
differences between air and space (and the lack of a specific international 
regime like the International Civil Aviation Organization mandating air 
regulations) may distinguish a space traffic controller from air traffic 
controllers for the sake of domestic claims in negligence.
In short, by taking an active role in the maneuvering of space objects 
into and out of harm’s way, the United States government may open itself up 
to a host of international liability concerns for damage caused to space 
objects due to its actions, as well as domestic liability for failure to protect 
American space assets. Fault is much easier to prove when there is evidence 
that the opposing party either could have done something about the accident 
and didn’t, or actively caused it through bad information or negligent 
behavior.
                                                          
41. Alexandre Kiss & Dinah L. Shelton, Strict Liability in International Environmental Law,
GEO. WASH. U. L. SCH. SCHOLARLY COMMONS 1131, 1136 (2007), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=2046&context=faculty_publications.
42. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2013).
43. Id.
44. See E. Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see also U.S. v. 
Union Tr., 330 U.S. 907 (1955).
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IV. INTERMEDIATE STEPS BEFORE STM AUTHORITIES
Given the current state of the space environment (a mess), and the 
interest of Congress, space traffic management authorities seem to be a 
guaranteed eventuality. With the potential for an increase in viable cases 
brought against the United States under the Liability Convention as explored 
above, some intermediary steps should be taken before such authorities are 
granted.
First, the United States should make a significant investment in its space 
object tracking system, including those augmentations available from the 
private sector. It is unrealistic to demand companies to expend precious 
resources to maneuver away from collisions that are as likely as not to 
happen. There must be a degree of certainty in the likelihood of accident 
before space traffic management authorities can be invoked.  This investment 
should also include incentivizing the use of materials that make space objects 
easier to track—reflective paint, tracking beacons, etc. 
Second, the United States should determine (as foreign policy) an 
official position on whether failure to heed a warning constitutes negligence 
and fault for an accident in space.
Finally, the government should interface with industry to determine 
acceptable levels of collision risk operators are willing to face before 
expending resources to maneuver. As the burden will fall disproportionately 
on large satellite operators with propulsion capabilities, it must be clear how 
much government influence on their maneuvering decisions is acceptable 
before operating in the United States becomes too burdensome.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States is clearly headed toward a regime in space similar to 
the air traffic management system on Earth—where a regulatory agency can 
demand a satellite move in order to avoid collision. This is not a bad idea.
The space environment is extremely congested and increasingly more 
dangerous and difficult to navigate. Introducing space traffic control may 
help clean up the mess. However, accepting that role may come with 
increased risk of liability for the actions of the government in steering 
satellites in and out of harm’s way. These risks must be carefully considered 
as space traffic management authorities are debated and built. Otherwise, the 
Liability Convention may finally be used with some regularity to demand 
payment for accidents in space (which are more and more likely to occur).

